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Abstract
This talk consists in a trick and a potential insight. The trick consists in
a minimalist interpretation of color mixture. The account of color mixture is
minimalist in the sense that, given certain background assumptions, there is
no more to Timaeus’ account of color mixture than the list of the chromatic
pathēmata and the list of how these combine to elicit perceptions of all the
colors. The only potential controversial elements of the minimalist interpre-
tation are the relevant background assumptions and the interpretation of the
chromatic pathēmata. The potential insight concerns a motive that Plato, in
the guise of Timaeus, may have for presenting an account of color mixture.
Speciﬁcally, I shall argue that on the minimalist interpretation, Plato may be
read as reconciling the Democritrean four color scheme with an older tradi-
tion where white and black are the fundamental chromatic opposition. As we
shall see, this bears on the interpretation of the chromatic pathēmata.
Perception, for Timaeus, is a kind of measurement. Pathēmata—affections of the
body as a whole or in part that are liable to produce perceptions or sensations—
are the measure of the powers of the agents that produced them, and perception
is the cognizance of what is measured, not the affections, but the powers that
produced these affections. Sensible qualities, for Timaeus, then, are corporeal
powers, powers to produce affections in sentient animate bodies. In the earlier
discussion of vision (46c-47e), Timaeus says nothing speciﬁc about the powers of
the agents that produce visual affections, nor does he say anything speciﬁc about
the nature of these affections. With respect to the sunaitia, the auxiliary causes
of vision, Timaeus largely conﬁnes himself to the construction of the visual body,
opsis, that is the primary recipient of affection in the causal process of visual per-
ception. Timaeus claims that the eye contains a ﬁre within that is emitted through
the pupil owing to its ﬁneness. Timaeus claims, in addition, that this ﬁre combines
with daylight, akin to it, in the direction that the perceiver is looking, to form a
body that may be acted upon as a homogenous unity. The present passage com-
pletes Timaeus’ account of the suniaitia of vision. For here we are told about the
powers of the agents that cause visual affections, namely the colors, and we are
told about how the visual body is affected by these powers.
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Colors consist in a kind of ﬂame, and since the visual body consists in the ﬁre
emitted from the eye combined with the ﬁre that constitutes daylight, each a mild
light that does not burn, three ﬁres of two kinds are involved in seeing the colors
of things. Timaeus makes at least three distinguishable claims about the colors:
(1) colors consist in kind of ﬁre, a ﬂame
(2) colors consist in effluences that emanate from bodies
(3) colors are perceptible if the effluences are proportional with the visual body
First, in his discussion of the genē, Timaeus claims that there are many kinds of
ﬁre but only offers three examples (58c5–d1). First, there is ﬂame, phlox. Second,
there is the kind that issues from ﬂame but does not burn but supplies light to the
eyes. And third, there is the kind that is left behind in embers after the ﬂame is
quenched. The ﬁre emitted by the eye and that constitutes the light of day both
are of the second kind. Presumably, their compound, the visual body, itself belongs
to the second kind. However, colors are said to consist in ﬂame.
Second, colors consist in effluences that emanate from bodies. This is a clear
allusion to the account that Socrates attributes to Empedocles in the Meno 76a–d,
an attribution seconded by Theophrastus in De sensibus. Colors may consist in ef-
ﬂuences that emanate from bodies, but I do not think that colors are identiﬁed
with effluences. First, Plato in the Theaetetus distinguished alteration from loco-
motion (181d), going so far as to introduce a neologism for quality, poiotēs (182a),
that which changes in alteration. Given this, the identiﬁcation of color, a quality,
with effluences, bodies in motion, can seem like a category mistake, and one that
Plato is in position to recognize. There are also phenomenological difficulties with
the identiﬁcation of colors with effluences. Typically we take ourselves to see col-
ored particulars. But can we really see colored particulars? Or are they occluded
from view by the ﬁery effluences they give off? Moreover, colors seem conﬁned to
the remote bounded region in which they appear, but effluences are not so con-
ﬁned. Besides these difficulties, there is, within the Timaeus itself, grounds to resist
the identiﬁcation colors with effluences. The effluences are ﬁre particles, primary
bodies, but only secondary bodies compounded of primary bodies are sensible. But
colors are sensible if they are colors at all. Moreover, the following pattern may
be observed in Timaeus’ discussion of the pathēmata, that the objects of perception
are powers of secondary bodies as determined by the primary bodies that compose
them. The chromatic powers would be the powers of secondary bodies to divide
or compact the visual body as determined by their emission of ﬁery effluences. If
we adhere to this pattern in interpreting Timaeus’ account of color, then it is not
susceptible to the three difficulties described above. Colors would not be efflu-
ences but powers to emit these and so a kind of poiotēs thus avoiding the charge of
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category mistake. These powers inhere in bounded surfaces of particular bodies,
thus respecting the phenomenology of vision. Moreover, they would not be oc-
cluded from view, since the effect of the ﬁery effluences is the measure of these
powers whose congizance vision consists in. If that is right, then Timaeus’ account
is an advance over Empedocles’ since Empedocles’ account seems susceptible to
these difficulties.
Third, colors are perceptible only if the chromatic effluences are proportional
with the ﬁre particles that constitute the visual body. Though clearly inspired
by Empedocles, Timaeus’ position is really the converse of Empedocles’. While
Timaeus retains Empedocles’ Eleatic conviction that sense objects are propor-
tional to sense, they differ in how the relevant proportion is implemented in the
sense object’s interaction with sense. According to Empedocles, only effluences
that ﬁt the poroi are perceptible. If an effluence is too large or too small to ﬁt, then
it fails to excite perception. However, according to Timaeus, if the ﬁre particles
are larger than the ﬁre particles that constitute the visual body, then they compact
that body so as to give rise to a perception of black. And if the particles are smaller
than the particles that constitute the visual body, then they divide it to give rise to
a perception of white. Like-sized particles, on the other hand, do not affect the vi-
sual body and so are insensible and are called “transparent”. So while Empedocles
claims that only like-sized particles excite perception, Timaeus’ view is that only
particles that are not like-sized excite perception. Rather than reduplicating the
Empedoclean scheme, Timaeus’ account of vision is its inversion.
Consider now not colors but their effects, the chromatic pathēmata. These are
not unrelated as colors are powers of the agents that produce these affections, and
these affections are the measure of these powers whose cognizance vision con-
sists in. The chromatic pathēmata are affections of the visual body. There are two
fundamental kinds of affections of the visual body, diakrisis and sugkrisis. Timaeus
explicitly tells us that the affections at work in our experience of white and black
respectively are the same affections at work in our experience of hot and cold
and astringent and harsh. Though these affections are identical, they give rise to
distinct perceptions and sensations because they differ in their causes (and also,
presumably, because these affections are received in different parts of the body).
These terms, as the occur in the present passage, are usually translated as dilation
and contraction, respectively. However, as applied to aggregates of natural bod-
ies, diakrisis is more naturally understood not as dilation but as a kind of division
or dispersal, and as applied to aggregates of natural bodies, sugkrisis is naturally
understood as compaction. As we have observed, the size of the ﬁery effluences
determine their effect on the visual body. If the ﬁre particles are smaller than
the ﬁre particles that compose the visual body, then they divide the visual body.
And if the ﬁre particles are larger than the ﬁre particles that compose the visual
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body, then they compact the visual body. These affections, division and com-
paction, are naturally opposed as are the powers to divide and to compact the
visual body. Timaeus calls “white” (leukon) the power to divide the visual body and
“black” (melan) the power to compact the visual body. This is why white and black
are the fundamental chromatic opposition.
The transparent (diaphanē) is a special case. If the ﬁre particles are like-sized with
the particles that compose the visual body, then they neither divide nor compact
it but simply have no effect and hence are insensible. This is an instance of the
more general principle that like does not affect like (57a3–5). It is worth pausing
to think about the lack of effect and its visual consequences. It is implausible to
suppose that the visual body extends no further than the like-sized effluences that
it confronts. In that case, we could see no further, and these effluences would not
properly be understood to be transparent. We would reach a perceptually impene-
trable boundary but the transparent is perceptually penetrable. Perhaps, then, the
like-sized ﬁre particles are assimilated by the visual body in the way that daylight
is and so extends its reach, so to speak. Timaeus might be playing with a potential
ambiguity in the Greek term diaphanē. Dia means through, but the occurrence of
phanē in diaphanē is potentially ambiguous. It might mean light or sight. The word
phanē means torch, and phanos means light or bright, whereas phaneros means open
to sight, visible, or manifest. So while it is natural for moderns to understand di-
aphanē as that which may be seen through, perhaps it also means that which may
be shone through. Interestingly, in the context of Timaeus’ account, these read-
ings are not unrelated. It is only if the visual body shines through does one see
through. In the context of Timaeus’ account, there might also be a further play on
this ambiguity, for, recall, the visual body only shines in the direction in which the
perceiver looks.
So depending upon the size of the ﬁre particles, they either divide, or compact,
or have no effect on the visual body. Division and compaction are the funda-
mental affections involved in vision. Moreover, they are naturally opposed. Since
white is the power to divide the visual body and black is the power to compact
it, these powers are themselves fundamentally and naturally opposed and so were
reckoned to be the primary colors. Taylor concurs. This is controversial, however.
Thus Brisson and Ierodiakonou claim that there are four primary colors, not only
white and black but red and what Timaeus calls “bright” (lampron) or “brilliant”
(stilbon). (Democritus also posits four primary colors: white, black, red, and green,
Theophrastus, De sensibus 73–5.)
The philosophical reason for counting white and black in the Timaean color
scheme as the primary colors is that they are the fundamental chromatic opposi-
tion. There are, however, additional historical reasons for this claim. This inter-
pretation of the Timaean color scheme is in line with an ancient tradition that
4
includes Homer, Parmenides, and Empedocles before Plato, and Aristotle and
Goethe after. Moreover, there is a general tendency in Greek color vocabulary to
emphasize brightness over hue. As supporting evidence this is pretty weak, admit-
tedly. However, there is a further bit of historical evidence that is puzzling, at the
very least. Theophrastus objects that Democritus posits four primary colors but
earlier thinkers posit only two, white and black (De sensibus 79). What is puzzling
is that Theophrastus makes no similar complaint about Plato. Thus, Theophras-
tus, like Taylor after him, must hold that there are only two primary colors in the
Timaeus.
I suspect that these seemingly competing interpretations may be reconciled. In-
deed, they are driven by distinct if potentially complementary ideas. Theophrastus
and Taylor are moved by the idea that white and black are the fundamental chro-
matic opposition. Brisson and Ierodiakonou are moved by the idea that white,
black, red, and brilliant are mixed to generate all the other colors. So perhaps
there is no real inconsistency here. Indeed, Timaeus account of color mixture can
be read as an attempt to accommodate the Democritean four color scheme within
an older tradition that takes white and black as the fundamental chromatic op-
position. To get this into view, let us begin by discussing the two other candidate
primary colors, brilliant and red. As we shall see, the pathēmata that are the exercise
of these chromatic powers involve both division and compaction.
Like white bodies, brilliant bodies have the power to emit ﬁre particles that di-
vide the visual body. However, the ﬁre particles emitted by brilliant bodies differ
in kind and are more rapid than the ﬁre particles emitted by white bodies. Timaeus
does not specify what this difference in kind consists in, but presumably it is a dif-
ference in the size of the tetrahedra. And since the tetrahedra emitted by brilliant
bodies are more rapid than the tetrahedra emitted by white bodies, presumably
they are smaller, since the smallness of polyhedra contribute to the speed of their
motion. The ﬁre particles emitted by brilliant bodies also differ in their effects.
Unlike the ﬁre particles emitted by white bodies, the ﬁre particles emitted by bril-
liant bodies divide the visual body all the way up to the eye where they produce
secondary effects.
The ﬁre particles emitted by brilliant bodies enter the eye. As they do, they
pass the ﬁre particles that the eye is itself emitting and penetrate and dissolve the
very passages from which these are emitted. This would only be possible if there
is no exact ﬁt between the ﬁre particles and the passages in the eye, just as there is
no exact ﬁt between the odorous particles and the blood vessels in the nostrils as
Vlastos long ago observed. In the eye, the incoming ﬁre particles encounter water.
This has two effects, only the second of which is relevant to visual phenomenology:
(1) the incoming ﬁre particles cause a volume of water and ﬁre to pour from the
eye
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(2) the incoming ﬁre particles are mixed with the water in the eye causing all kinds
of colors to appear
The ﬁrst secondary effect, the pouring forth of a volume of water and ﬁre, is called
“tears”. Though a vital affection, unlike trembling’s contribution to our sense of
coldness, the production of tears does not contribute to the dazzling visual expe-
rience. It is epiphenomenal to the causal process that elicits that experience. In
this way it contrasts with the second effect. When the incoming ﬁre is mixed with
the eye’s moisture, this mixture causes all kinds of colors to appear. Apparently,
in a striking anticipation of Newton’s discovery (Opticks 1), the stream of incoming
ﬁre is refracted in the water of the eye (compare Aristotle’s claim that a weak light
shining through a dense medium will cause all kinds of colors to appear, Metero-
logica 1.5 342b5–8). The resulting visual experience is called “dazzling” (marmarugē)
and the power of the agent that produced it is called “bright” (lampron) or “brilliant”
(stilbon).
The incoming ﬁre particles dissolve and so destroy, at least in part, the passages
in the eyes. Though Timaeus does not make this explicit, this is a departure from
the natural state of the eye and is presumably painful (think of staring at the sun).
The disruption of the visual body may not be painful since no violent effort is re-
quired to do so, but what is dissolved, here, is not the visual body issuing from
the eyes but the passages of the eyes from which the visual body issues. These
are composed of particles greater than the particles of ﬁre that compose the visual
body and so require violent effort to dissolve. Recall, too, that while the ﬁre in the
eyes is of a kind that gives light but does not burn, the incoming ﬁre is not of this
kind but is, rather, a kind of ﬂame and so does indeed burn. This explains the dam-
age inﬂicted by seeing brilliant bodies. The dazzling experience of brilliant bodies
thus approaches the traumatic experience undergone by the Cyclops as Odysseus
blinds him by inserting ﬁre in his eye. Not only are both experiences destructive
and painful, but each is a kind of blinding since when dazzled it is difficult to see
the details of the scene before one.
Both white and brilliant are powers to divide the visual body, but what distin-
guishes brilliance from white is not this affection but a secondary effect, the mixing
of ﬁre and water in the eye. In the case of the dazzling, the affection as a whole
includes not only division but this mixture as well. Seeing white involves an affec-
tion produced by ﬁre alone, a dazzling experience involves an affection produced
by ﬁre and water. While the ﬁre that elicits a dazzling experience may be more in-
tensely bright, understood as the amount of light, its mixture with water involves a
reduction of chromatic brightness, understood as a dimension of color similarity,
with the effect that all sorts of colors appear and not pure white. Mixing with the
eye’s water darkens. Perhaps it does so by compacting the incoming stream of ﬁre
particles that mixes with it, in which case the water of the eye is black. There is
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an ancient tradition that assigns black as the color of water. Thus, Anaxagoras,
Empedocles, and later Aristotle all held that water is black. If Timaeus subscribes
to this tradition, then the pathēmata caused by brilliant bodies involves both divi-
sion and compaction.
Let us now consider Timaeus account of red. Just as brilliant bodies emit a dis-
tinctive kind of ﬁre particle, so red things emit a distinctive kind of ﬁre particle.
Again, it is plausible to assume that this difference in kind has to do with the size
of the tetrahedra. Concerning this, Timaeus says of this kind that it is between
“these”, but there is unclarity about this anaphoric reference. Since Timaeus has
just been discussing brilliant, it is plausible that the ﬁre particles emitted by bril-
liant bodies is one of the kinds of ﬁre to which the ﬁre particles emitted by red
bodies is being compared. But what is the other kind of ﬁre? Archer-Hind claims
that it is the ﬁre that is emitted by white bodies while Bury claims that it is the ﬁre
that is emitted by black bodies. Archer-Hind’s reading, that Brisson shares, may
be justiﬁed in the following manner: Like the ﬁre emitted from brilliant bodies,
the ﬁre emitted by red bodies enters they eye and mixes with the water therein to
produce a sanguine appearance that we call “red” (eruthron). It thus must be more
like the ﬁre emitted from brilliant bodies than the ﬁre emitted from white bodies.
The matter is unclear. I suspect, however, that Archer-Hind’s interpretation is
correct. If he is, then, given the assumption that kinds of ﬁre are associated with
sizes of ﬁre particles, the ﬁre particles emitted by red bodies are smaller than the
ﬁre particles emitted by white bodies and larger than the ﬁre particles emitted by
brilliant bodies. Nevertheless, they are small enough and rapid enough to divide
the visual body all the way up to the eyes and so mix with their waters.
The ﬁre emitted by red bodies, like the ﬁre emitted by brilliant bodies, divides
the visual body all the way up to the eye. And like the ﬁre emitted by brilliant
bodies, it mixes with the water of the eye to produce a secondary effect. This
secondary effect differs from the secondary effect involved in dazzling visual ex-
periences in two ways. First, no tearing is involved. Second, instead of causing all
kinds of colors to appear, it causes, instead, a sanguineous appearance that we call
“red”. How are we to understand this? There is an ancient tradition that assigns
black as the color of water. If Timaeus subscribes to this tradition, then the water
in the eye is itself black, and so compacts the incoming stream of ﬁre. And the
fact that the stream of ﬁre that passes through the dark waters in the eye produces
an experience of red is an expression of red being intermediary between white and
black. Moreover, if red is not merely intermediate but midway, then Aristotle’s
claim about red would then turn out to be of Timaean provenance.
Like the perception of white, the perception of brilliant and red each involves
the division of the visual body. What distinguishes the perception of brilliant and
red from the perception of white is not the division of the visual body but the
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secondary effects, involving the mixture of ﬁre and water, induced by this divi-
sion. The mixture of ﬁre and water in the eye differ in the case of brilliant and
red because of the kind of ﬁre involved, plausibly understood in terms of relative
size and a difference in the rapidity of their motion. And in each case the mixture
of ﬁre and water involves a reduction of brightness due to water compacting the
incoming ﬁre. In the case of brilliant, the mixture results in the appearance of all
kinds of colors, many, at least, are not white. And in the case of red, the mixture
results in the appearance of an even darker color. And in each case the reduc-
tion of brilliance is due to the water being black and so compacting the incoming
ﬁre. If the fundamental opposition in the Timaean color scheme derives from the
opposition of diakrisis and sugkrisis, then brilliant and red are intermediary colors
between white and black, yielding the series: white, brilliant, red, and black, with
white and black being the primary opposition.
Timaeus prefaces his discussion of color mixture with a warning. It would be
foolish to state the exact proportions involved in such mixtures, even if one knew
these, since no demonstrative nor even probable reason could be given (68b6–8).
And he concludes his discussion of color mixture by charging any experimental
inquiry into these proportions with impiety. Only God is wise enough and power-
ful enough to blend the many into one and dissolve the one into many (68c7–d7).
So while we can know which colors need to be mixed to generate another color,
it is impossible for mortals to determine by test the exact proportions involved.
Even if we somehow came to know these proportions, by the testimony of a god
or oracular revelation, say, we would still not understand how mixing colors in
these proportions generate the colors that they do, for no demonstrative or even
probable reason would be available to us.
The full signiﬁcance of these enigmatic remarks is unclear. However they are
to be understood, I think that we should resist any cynical interpretation where
Timaeus is preemptively silencing his critics, or providing a license to engage in
an Athenian parlour game. Rather than manifesting a lack of seriousness, these
remarks are the expression of a profound humility. For in making them, Timaeus
concedes that the visible may not be fully understood by the intellect of mortals,
thus confessing to the limitation of his cosmological project.
Moreover, and importantly, these remarks turn on an already stated principle,
that proportionate bonds generated by the Demiurge can only be dissolved by the
Demiurge. This principle is used in the argument that the body of the cosmos is
composed of the four primary bodies, and in the assurance the Demiurge gives to
the young gods. So if the Demiurge overcomes the opposition of the powers of
division and compaction by positing proportionate intermediate powers that unite
all in chromatic amity, only He may rend asunder what is thus bound.
Timaeus lists nine colors that are the result of mixing the four colors, white,
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black, bright or brilliant, and red or the further results of such mixtures (68b5–c7).
These are:
(1) golden (xanthon) = bright (lampron) + red (eruthron) + white (leukon)
(2) purple (alourgon) = red (eruthron) + black (melan) + white (leukon)
(3) violet (orphinon) = black (melan) + purple (alourgon)
(4) tawny (purron) = golden (xanthon) + grey (phaion)
(5) gray (phaion) = white (leukon) + black (melan)
(6) yellow (ochron) = white (leukon) + golden (xanthon)
(7) dark blue (kuanoun) = white (leukon) + bright (lampron) + black (melas)
(8) light blue (glaukon) = dark blue (kuanoun) + white (leukon)
(9) leek green (prasinon) = tawny (purron) + black (melan)
The precise sense of Greek color terms is notoriously difficult to capture in trans-
lation, and so the translations provided here are only rough equivalents and do not
capture precise hue boundaries.
If we resolve the combinations with mixed colors into the colors from which
they are themselves mixed we get:
(1) golden (xanthon) = bright (lampron) + red (eruthron) + white (leukon)
(2) purple (alourgon) = red (eruthron) + black (melan) + white (leukon)
(3) violet (orphinon) = black (melan) + (red (eruthron) + black (melan) + white (leukon))
(4) tawny (purron) = (bright (lampron) + red (eruthron) + white (leukon)) + (white (leukon)
+ black (melan))
(5) gray (phaion) = white (leukon) + black (melan)
(6) yellow (ochron) = white (leukon) + (bright (lampron) + red (eruthron) + white (leukon))
(7) dark blue (kuanoun) = white (leukon) + bright (lampron) + black (melan)
(8) light blue (glaukon) = (white (leukon) + bright (lampron) + black (melan)) + white
(leukon)
(9) leek green (prasinon) = (bright (lampron) + red (eruthron) + white (leukon)) + (white
(leukon) + black (melan)) + black (melan)
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Ordering all thirteen colors from light to dark, we get:
(1) white (leukon)




(6) leek green (prasinon)
(7) red (eruthron)
(8) light blue (glaukon)





The list was generated given the following assumptions. First, that the four un-
mixed colors ordered in terms of chromatic brightness are white, brilliant, red,
and black. Second that brilliant is close to white in chromatic brightness. Third,
like the Aristotelian color scheme, red is midway between white and black. These
assumptions were then applied to Timaeus’ color combinations to yield the bright-
ness ordering. As the unknowable proportions can make a difference, the ordering
could only be an estimate, but it conforms reasonably well to intuitive judgments of
relative brightness. There are difficulties in understanding the colors as interme-
diaries in the opposition between white and black. However, if we bracket these
difficulties, this is a reasonably comprehensible ordering and less mysterious than
some commentators have made it out to be.
How are we to understand color mixture as Timaeus understands it? Attempts
have been made to understand mixture, here, on the model of the painter’s prac-
tice of pigment mixture. The painter’s practice of pigment mixture may have inﬂu-
enced Plato’s thinking, at least indirectly, but, in the ﬁrst instance, we should try to
understand Timaeus’ account of color mixture in terms of the powers of colored
bodies to emit ﬁery effluences. There are historical, textual, and philosophical
reasons for this.
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The historical reason concerns the observed general tendency for the Greeks
in antiquity to understand colors in terms of relative brightness. This occurs in
both literary and philosophical sources such as Homer, Parmenides, Empedocles,
and, later, Aristotle. Plato knew these sources and was in many ways inﬂuenced by
them, it would be unsurprising should a commitment to this ancient tradition be
manifest in Timaeus’ account.
The textual reason concerns a consequence of the Timaean account of color. Ac-
cording to Timaeus, colors are powers of bodies to emit ﬁery effluences. If colors
are powers of bodies to emit ﬁery effluences, then it would be natural to suppose
that color combinations are combinations of these powers. Moreover, in arguing
that the body of the cosmos is composed of the four primary bodies, Timaeus held
that powers may stand in proportionate ratios. Of course, more needs to be said
about what the combination of powers amounts to. But given that colors just are
these powers, their combination must be combinations of these powers. A mix-
ture of anything else would not be a color mixture, at least by Timaeus’ lights.
The philosophical reason concerns the distinction between color and pigment
mixture. The colors are not pigments, and so color mixture is not pigment mix-
ture. It is important to distinguish the mixture of colors that generate different
colors from the mixture of bodies that generate differently colored bodies. Pig-
ment mixture is a mixture of bodies that generate differently colored bodies. So
we should try to understand color mixture in terms other than pigment mixture,
especially in light of the material recalcitrance of the latter. Thus, for example,
the color mixing that results from mixing pigments is a subtractive process, and
Helmholtz showed that not every color determined by an additive process can be
matched with a color determined by a subtractive process. Helmholtz’s demon-
stration was unavailable to the ancients, but it is not anachronistic to suppose that
they could mark the distinction between color and pigment mixture. Thus Aris-
totle criticizes attempts to understand color mixture in terms of pigment mixture
in De sensu 3. And the Peripatetic author of De coloribus writes:
But we must make our investigation into these things not by mixing
colours as painters do, but by comparing the rays which are reﬂected
from those to which we have already referred. For one could especially
consider the mixing of rays in nature. (De coloribus 2 792b17–21)
Katerina Ierodiakonou proposes an account of this kind (as does Liz James).
Ierodiakonou begins by observing that the terms diakrisis and sugkris appear in
Timaeus’ explanation of the cycle of elemental transformation (58b7). In certain
circumstances, smaller primary bodies divide larger ones with the result that, for
example, we get two tetrahedra of ﬁre from one octahedron of air. Similarly, in
certain circumstances, larger primary bodies may compress smaller ones so as to
combine them such that we get one octahedron of air from two tetrahedra of ﬁre.
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Her suggestion, then, is to apply this model to the division and compaction of the
visual body.
If the ﬁre particles emitted from a colored body are smaller than the ﬁre particles
that compose the visual body, then these are broken down into smaller tetrahedra.
And if the ﬁre particles emitted from a colored body are larger than the ﬁre par-
ticles that compose the visual body, then these are compressed and so combined
into larger tetrahedra. So Ierodiakonou is advancing a speciﬁc interpretation of
division and compaction here. The visual body is divided by dividing the tetrahe-
dra that compose it and is compacted by combining smaller tetrahedra into larger
tetrahedra.
It is now open to Ierodiakonou to understand color mixture in terms of the mix-
ture different-sized tetrahedra in the visual body as determined by the operations
of division and compaction:
Let us take, for example, the simple case of the colour grey which is said
to be a mixture of white and black. This, I suggest, is to be understood
in the following way: a grey body emits ﬁre-particles of two different
sizes; namely they are pyramids which, separated according to size, are
of the kind emitted by white and by black bodies, respectively. The
pyramids of these two different sizes emitted by the grey body interact
with and transform the particles of the visual body into smaller and
larger particles so that the visual body ends up containing the same
proportion of pyramids of these two sizes as the grey body emits.
The power of white and black bodies to divide and compact the visual body
may produce in it smaller and larger tetrahedra, but is there reason to think that
the power of red and brilliant bodies themselves produce tetrahedra of distinctive
sizes? After all, their eliciting the visual experiences they do is not due solely to
their effect on the visual body but is due as well to their secondary effect on the wa-
ter of the eye. But this is downstream from the visual body (relative to the motion
of the ﬁre particles emitted from the colored body), no matter the sizes of tetrahe-
dra from which the visual body is composed. Moreover, since the secondary effect
is downstream, division cannot merely mean the division of constituent tetrahe-
dra, it must mean, as well, the division of the visual body as a whole. Otherwise,
how would the small and swift ﬁery effluences reach the water of the eye? And
while it is true that in the cycle of elemental transformation smaller primary bod-
ies may divide larger primary bodies and larger primary bodies may compact and
so combine smaller primary bodies, these are all cases of primary bodies of dif-
ferent kinds. Timaeus never explicitly says that that smaller ﬁre particles may
divide larger ﬁre particles into their constituent triangles. So while Ierodiakonou’s
account of Timaean color mixture is both ingenious and of the right kind, I am
hesitant to endorse it.
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There are, of course, alternatives. Consider only the most obvious. Associated
with white, brilliant, red, and black are distinct affections of the visual body or the
eyes from which it issues depending upon the size and rapidity of the ﬁre particles
emitted from the colored body. Perhaps what are combined are powers to produce
these chromatic pathēmata. Recall that there are four of them:
(1) White bodies divide the visual body with small and rapid ﬁre particles
(2) Brilliant bodies divide the visual body with smaller and more rapid ﬁre particles
that mix with the waters of the eye that compact them
(3) Red bodies divide the visual body with larger and less rapid ﬁre particles (though
smaller and more rapid than the ﬁre particles emitted by white bodes) that mix
with the waters of the eye that compact them
(4) Black bodies compact the visual body with the largest and slowest of the ﬁre
particles
The color combinations that Timaeus describes can be understood as combi-
nations of powers to produce these pathēmata. So, for example, purple bodies will
emit small and large ﬁre particles but where there are two grades of small particles.
The large particles, the slowest, will compact the visual body while the small par-
ticles will divide it. The smallest and fastest of these, however, divide the visual
body all the way up to the eye where they mix with the eye’s water and are com-
pacted by it. Thus, purple bodies will act upon the visual body and the eye from
which it issues in the ways that white, black, and red bodies do and thus combine
these powers in some unknowable proportion. And so on for all the other color
combinations that Timaeus describes. Combining the list of the four chromatic
pathēmata, the exercise of the powers of white, brilliant, red, and black, with the
list of Timaeus’ color combinations where the combinations with mixed colors are
resolved into combinations of colors from which they were mixed, yields a reason-
ably comprehensible and comprehensive account of color mixture. It is at least as
comprehensible as the ordering of the colors from light to dark that it generates,
and as we have seen, it does indeed generate a reasonably comprehensible bright-
ness ordering. And with respect to comprehensiveness, all that is missing is what
Timaeus claims mortal intellects could never have, knowledge and understanding
of the proportions involved in such combinations. Moreover, this account, far
from being inconsistent with Ierodiakonou’s, may be combined with it, at least
to a certain extent. On the hybrid account, an effect of the combined actions on
the visual body is that it is composed of differently sized tetrahedra, whether or
not brilliant and red are best understood as corresponding to distinctive sizes of
tetrahedra.
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On the present interpretation, Timaeus can be understood as accommodating
Democritus’ claim that the mixture of four colors suffices for the generation of
the colors within an older chromatic tradition that sees white and black as the
fundamental chromatic opposition. Timaeus departs from the four color scheme
in substituting brilliant for green (chlōron). But, importantly, the substitution pre-
serves the relative order of brightness. Brilliant, like green, is brighter than red
and darker than white. And whereas Democritus only posits seven generated col-
ors, Timaeus posits nine. In this way, it is an elaboration. And while some of
the Democritean color combinations are preserved in the Timaean color scheme,
there are adjustments given the substitution of brilliant for green, but in a way
that preserves the overall structure. Perhaps this accommodation of the Dem-
ocritean color scheme within the older tradition is an instance of Timaeus’ tacit
rivalry with Democritean natural philosophy. Democritus had written an entire
book on color, and his claim that the mixture of four colors suffice to generate the
colors was shared with medical and artistic traditions. Thus the medical tradition
associated four colors with blood, phlegm, and black and yellow bile. And there is
literary and archeological evidence that ﬁfth century BCE painters restricted their
palette to four colors. Moreover, accommodating Democritus’ four color scheme
in a way that preserves the fundamental opposition between white and black would
explain why Timaeus is not subject to Theophrastus’ criticism of Democritus (De
sensibus 79). All that was needed was to postulate, in addition to the the power
of black bodies, two further powers to reduce chromatic brightness that, while
distinct, themselves depend upon blackness. Brightness is reduced, not the way
black bodies do, by emitting large particles that compact the visual body, but by
emitting small particles that are themselves compacted in their mixing with the
eyes’ waters. These powers differ in the proportion of ﬁre and water in the mix-
ture that they elicit in the eyes. These powers may differ in this way, but they are
alike in that neither are wholly independent of the power of black bodies. The
water’s compaction of the incoming ﬁre particles just is the exercise of its black-
ness. What are distinguished are degrees of departure from whiteness, a reduction
in chromatic brightness, where black alone remains in opposition to white and is
presupposed by the two other departures from whiteness. That brilliant and red
cannot be combined by themselves to generate a color but must be combined with
either white or black to do so is further evidence of their derivative nature.
The way that Timaeus’ account diverges from Empedocles’ would also be ex-
plained, at least in part. Theophrastus objects to Empedocles’ account that while
he has explained the perception of white in terms of the reception of ﬁery efflu-
ences and the perception of black in terms of the reception of watery effluences,
he has not explained the perception of any other color (De Sensibus 17). However,
Empedocles may be understood as claiming that the perception of the rest of the
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colors involve different proportions of ﬁre and water received through the eyes’
passages. Timaeus accepts the basic idea that white and black are the fundamental
chromatic opposition. Timaeus also accepts the Eleatic idea that the intermediary
colors should be understood in terms of mixtures of various proportions (even if
knowledge of these proportions would require a god’s knowledge that Empedocles’
impiously claims for himself). However, accommodating Democritus’ four color
scheme within the older tradition that Timaeus shares with Empedocles required
postulating two further ways of reducing brightness beyond the way that black
bodies do, and this, in turn, required corresponding adjustments to the Empedo-
clean scheme. For example, that only some chromatic effluences enter the eye,
those emitted by brilliant and red bodies, is a departure from Empedocles that re-
sults from such adjustment, as is the revised role of the eye’s water. Thus Taylor
was wrong to see Timaeus account of color and its perception as simply an appli-
cation of Empedocles’, just as Archer-Hind was wrong to deny any Empedoclean
inﬂuence.
Let me end by considering one of Theophrastus’ objections to Timaeus’ account
of color. Speciﬁcally, Theophrastus doubts whether color could invariably be un-
derstood in terms of ﬂame:
It is absurd … to say without exception that colour is a ﬂame. For while
in some respects the colour white resembles ﬂame, black would seem
to be ﬂame’s opposite. (Theophrastus, De sensibus 91)
How could the perception of black result from ﬂame? While the worry can seem
intuitively compelling, a reply may be made on behalf of Timaeus. Consider a
black image on a television or computer screen. Should one turn the screen off, it
will be gray and not black. And yet when on, it was emitting light which resulted
in a perception of black and not gray. Understanding how this may be so may
be puzzling in the way that Theophrastus suggests, but it is demonstratively so
nonetheless. What is needed to resolve this puzzlement is the distinction between
brightness as amount of light and brightness as a dimension of color similarity. And
while the means to empirically establish this requires some method, unavailable
in antiquity, of measuring the amount of light, the distinction can be found, in
embryonic form, in Timaeus’ account. Brilliant bodies, in their rapid emission of
small tetrahedra, are very bright, but they elicit in us the appearance of all kinds
of colors not all of which are white.
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